Friday, September 3, 2010

Taxes as Solidarity

«Ο φόρος για αυτή την κυβέρνηση δεν είναι χαράτσι, είναι αλληλεγγύη, γιατί οι φόροι με αυτή την κυβέρνησησημαίνουν ότι αυτά τα λεφτά θα πάνε εκεί όπου πρέπει. Θα πάνε για να στηρίξουν περισσότερο εκείνα τα κοινωνικά στρώματα που το έχουν ανάγκη,όπως βεβαίως και μια αναπτυξιακή διαδικασία». 

The tax for this Government is not a hike, it is solidarity, because the taxes [raised by] this government means that this money will go where it should. It will go to support those social strata  which need it, as well of course to a development process. "

George Papandreou, quoted in To Vima, 3 September 2010

No matter how hard Prime Minister Papandreou may be trying, he is failing. It is impossible to describe the rage, the cynicism and the disgust the average citizen or resident of Greece feels when she or he reads this kind of statement.

For years, our taxes will go to pay off a gargantuan public debt. For years, we have been receiving sub-standard public services in every domain, from education to security and from healthcare to telecommunications.

For years, taxes are being taken from those who pay them, to those who do not: farmers, teachers, civil servants and other special interest groups who enjoy full pensions, subsidies, easy work conditions and long holidays, which they have not paid for.

For years, the political parties have raided public procurement, amassed bribes and kickbacks, which they have never been forced to return or account for. After years of investigations of the “structured bond” scandal, the Siemens scandal, the Vatopedi scandal, no one is in jail, no money has been regained. The number of “hidden” scandals which are not being investigated can be counted in the hundreds.

The corporate sector and the middle class in Greece are being destroyed by direct and indirect taxes on the one hand, and higher costs of living on the other. The average middle-class professional pays over 50% of his or her total wage in direct and indirect taxation, providing of course they declare it.

The lower income groups face the prospect of hunger, rising unemployment and declining social mobility. Greece, with all its talk about social solidarity, has the least effective spending on social policy, according to European Commission studies. Which means the money is wasted, or ill-spent.

Kathimerini’s editorial comment today describes my sentiments exactly.

State needs to change, not taxes

Prime Minister George Papandreou said yesterday that citizens should not view the imposition of more taxes as another slap in the face but, rather, as an act of solidarity.


Had he been talking about some other country, one in Northern Europe perhaps, where the revenues from taxes go toward helping the more needy members of society, he would have been right. As things stand, however, taxes in Greece go toward propping up a wasteful and corrupt state apparatus.


Citizens would surely have no problem paying higher taxes if they could see the benefits, if they saw a crackdown on tax evasion and an improvement in state services. Right now all they see are their contributions getting bigger as the state continues to waste and fails to make the changes necessary in crucial areas.


Under these circumstances, of course Greeks see taxes as a slap in the face and they will continue to do so until things change and they feel that the state is on their side and their money is being well spent.

ELGA: The Latest Addition to Greek Public Debt

The news announced on September 1st 2010 that the government is assuming responsibility for the Hellenic Agricultural Insurance Organisation’s (ELGA) debt of EUR 3.8 bln was yet another indication that Greece’s public debt will swell far higher than its deficit this year.

As part of its fiscal restructuring plan, the government is either choosing to or being forced to take on the debt of a number of semi-governmental organisations (DEKO), such as the Hellenic Railroad Organisation. By my count, which is certainly incomplete, Greece will have “added” the following debt in 2010:

·         EUR 3.8 bln ELGA      
   
·         EUR 6 bln healthcare settlement

·         EUR 10 bln OSE debt assumption

·         EUR 2 bln other public organisations, guaranteed by the government

·         EUR 15 bln government deficit (this is my assumption: the government needs EUR 25-26 bln in revenue to make up the Memorandum targets this year, but has delayed payments to a number of beneficiaries, so the net revenue estimates probably do not portray the true situation).

Total Debt Assumption: EUR 36.8 bln in 2010

I am not certain if the EUR 6 bln in the healthcare settlement is already on the debt books or not. By the same token, it is impossible to know if the ELGA debt was already counted on Greece’s central government debt balance, or within its wider public sector debt. Judging by the language used

The most recent estimate available for central government debt is provided by the Greek public debt management agency, which provides a 31.03.10 figure for central government debt of EUR 310.4 bln.

It is difficult to understand whether the healthcare settlement is included in this or not: the healthcare announcement was made on 16.06.2010, so presumably it is not. Similarly, the OSE announcement (26.06.10) and the ELGA announcement (01.09.10) would also not be included in the EUR 310.4 bln estimate.

There is currently another EUR 1.2 bln in unpaid healthcare debt this year, while certain payments due for military procurement, public sector construction, public sector staff salaries, and certain pension funds are also rising and have apparently not been made.

If Greece’s debt on 31.03.2010 was EUR 310 bln, by the end of 2010, we can assume that total debt will have risen to EUR 347.2 bln.  

Taking into account a forecast GDP decline of 5% (my estimate), Greece’s GDP will be EUR 225 bln, and its debt:GDP ratio will be 154%.

Of course, tax collection may improve, expenditure may fall further, absorption of EU funds, and privatisations may occur, reducing the overall debt load. But this is difficult to imagine given the current economic conditions. Exacerbating the situation is the fact that much ministerial activity appears to have stalled over the issue of impending regional and local election, while the prospect of rapid absorption of EU funds has been tossed about for months now, but has not occurred.   

It is impossible to know how much other “hidden public debt” is in the system. The IMF recently announced that a Greek default was “unnecessary, undesirably, and unlikely”.  While I hope they are right, I can’t help but question the data and assumptions they are using, since we are being treated to constantly changing numbers and lack the basic composition of Greece’s public debt.  

Thursday, September 2, 2010

Living la Vida Loca

One of the nicest things about Greece is leaving it. If this sounds like a back-handed compliment, it is. Summers in Greece are usually crowded with loutish tourists and unwashed “entrepreneurs” driving suicide taxis or serving roadkill souvlaki. Unfortunately, this is what 20% of Greek GDP is based on, and the main reason I try to leave Greece for at least 2 months every summer.*

If it’s any consolation, there used to be one price for tourists and one price for Greeks. Now, there’s just one equally bad price, and equally bad quality, for everyone. I no longer have to explain to my international friends visiting Greece to be careful of atrocious food in Plaka or crooked taxi drivers at the airport: now everyone eats the same crap and pays the same high price.

I was lucky enough to spend a month in the United States in July, and nearly a month in France in August. I  returned to Greece two days ago and made the mistake to turning on the TV. What's happened since then? 

·         The Prefecture of Piraeus is suing the owner of a vacant lot in Spetses because this guy had the temerity to set up a metal stage for the wedding of Nikolaos and Tatiana. Apparently, he didn’t have permission from the town planning authority (although he did receive some other kind of permission), and because of that is being sued for EUR 296,000. This is from a prefecture based in a city which is congested, polluted, full of illegal cafes and restaurants and illegally-build apartments, and where drug dealing and prostitution occur openly every day and every night. But it was apparently a major violation to set up a metal stage – on someone’s own property – for 24 hours and the price of this “crime” is EUR 296,000.

·         ERT aired a hagiography of George Papandreou’s “Symi Symposium”. This features a group of largely like-minded caviar socialists and other beneficiaries of public money who gather every year to discuss issues like “Democracy and Globalisation”. This year, the leader of Germany’s Greens insisted that Greece invest more in trains, “because this is the future”, while our Prime Minister concluded with the statement to the effect that “people and solidarity are more important than Euros.” They certainly are, especially when it’s Other People’s Money. Our creditors will be laughing all the way to the bank with that one.  

·         I visited our local branch of the National Bank of Greece – the “steam engine of Greece’s development”, as it were. One teller was unhappily and unwillingly working, one teller was scratching his ass, and four other people were sitting behind desks, talking to their friends on the company phone or eating tyropittes. Welcome to Greece’s largest company.

·         A total ban on smoking in public spaces was introduced. Don’t even get me started on that one. Just because I’m a masochist, I’m going to start calling the police every time I see someone smoking in a restaurant. Since they no longer bother to show up for traffic accidents or burglaries, it will be a relief to see Minister Mariana Xenogiannakopoulou forcing them to fine smokers. I will also be sure to tell the tellers at the Halandri Commercial Bank branch that they can no longer smoke behind the counter.

Yes, I am in dark mood. It was a great summer, and it was great being in countries where customer service and professionalism count for something. In New York, for instance, I had to get a new Citibank ATM card issued: I was led into a spotless office by a smiling, clean service manager in a suit and tie who went over my file, looked at my ID, and issued a card on the spot, in less than 10 minutes.** Try doing this at Eurobank.

We sent a box of books from the Port St. Lucie Post Office in Florida to Athens. The facility was spotless. The line took less than 5 minutes, there were four people working, and the average processing time per customer took about 2-3 minutes. The staff were ultra professional.** In the Geraka Post Office, there will be 30 people in line, one person “working” (while two people scratch themselves), and it will take an average of 8-10 minutes per person processing time.

We drove over 2,000 km this summer, in Florida, Colorado, Arizona, Utah and Nevada. In all this time, not a single car beeped, tried to cut us off, burned a red light, or otherwise gave us a feeling that our lives were in danger. Drivers were actually friendly, everyone from the Celebration Wal Mart parking lot to the Florida Turnpike. Try driving 4 km from Geraka to the Atlantis sports club in Pallini (conveniently located next to the local cemetery) and see how that goes.

I start September one year older and a little bit wiser*** and with some new plans:

a.       I will not watch any more Greek TV.

b.      I will resolutely reflexively distrust or disbelieve any press release or announcement put out by the Greek government, or at the very least suspect that the true state of affairs is the opposite of what is being announced.

c.       I will keep my head down, focus on work, and delocate my company out of this country so when it (the country) finally does go bankrupt and collapses, I will still be able to provide for my family.

d.      I will eventually, perhaps in mid-September, creep out of my suburban bubble to a nice island like Naxos and, with the tourism madness abated, remember Greece as it used to be.

e.       I can’t wait until next summer.

But wait… weren’t these last September’s plans?


* At this point, I’m sure lots of people will try to convince me to the contrary: “But I know this great island called Astipalaia with really friendly people etc.” Don’t bother. I grew up here before mass tourism, Albanian waiters and lamb-chops-and-peas main courses in Corfu tourist traps, and I can assure you that since 2000 or so, travel in Greece is inevitably disappointing, or very, very expensive.  

** Let no one say the US government does not know how to provide considerate, professional service. Yes, Citibank may have nearly bankrupted the world; yes Post Office employees do occasionally rampage; yes, we may have invaded Iraq in the name of democracy. But hey, great customer service, guys. Honestly.  

*** Readers of this and other posts may question this assumption. 

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

A Financial Look Forward

Back in January, I forecast that the end of central bank quantitative easing would cause a contagion in sovereign debt in smaller, riskier markets (Greece, Ireland, Spain), and that the sale of public debt would be impossible to finance from purely market resources. (See my post The Coming Crash of 2010, January 19th, 2010).

Unfortunately, my forecast on the sovereign debt crisis has been amply borne out by the events in Greece and other Eurozone countries. Yesterday’s announcement by the US Federal Reserve that that mortgage bond proceeds would be used to purchase about $ 10 bln/month in US government bonds, confirm that QE will have to continue into the future. 

Obviously, there is no choice. The US government needs liquidity, whether in the form of a vast public deficit, or in the form of additional balance sheet adjustments, e.g. by treating the Fed as a special purpose vehicle to off-load mortgage-backed securities. Most European governments face exactly the same dilemma. In the next months to the end of 2010, we will see the Bank of England extend its Asset Purchase Facility spending on UK government bonds, and the ECB continue to refinance banks and governments through various active measures.

The portents, however, are far more serious than we may understand by looking at isolated events:

a.       US GDP growth is ostensibly in positive territory, although I have yet to see a quantitative analysis of how much of this is due to government stimulus spending at various levels of the economy. For instance, while recent annualised GDP growth rates have reached 3%, we should not forget that the government has disbursed at least $ 400 bln in various stimulous packages per year over the past two years, or about 2.7% of GDP each year. Indirect indicators, such as inventory stocking and unemployment, seem to show that the recovery may be far more fragile than anticipated. Federal, state and local public finances are in a parlous state, and unfunded pension liabilities are rising.

b.      With the Euro in its expected rebound against the US dollar, I expect exports and general economic growth in Germany to slow. Although manufacturing orders and confidence have been surging, a quick look at the destinations of exports does not portend well for the future. Despite all the positive press about Germany’s successful economic model, we should not lose sight of the fact that this depends on healthy international demand for Germany’s high-cost exports. With the Euro rising, and with corporate and consumer spending endangered in most export markets, I do not count on the German export boom to last long at its current rates. Factoring in increasing incoherence in the German governing coalition, and the prospects of a change in government in the next years which would resume a labour-friendly policy, makes me “short” on Germany.

c.       In Japan, public debt has hit 200% of GDP. The first, small-scale measures to raise bond yields have been taken to somehow convince domestic investors to continue investing in public debt, but how long can this continue? Any crisis involving Japan, for instance a major earthquake, a problem with China or a spike in oil prices to over $ 100/bbl, will create a major problem for Japan’s exports and its public debt. Unless serious measures are taken, we cannot discount the possibility of a Japanese default in the next 2-5 years. Such an event would be less serious for Western banks, given that most Japanese government debt is held by domestic investors, but the shock-waves this would send through the system will be critical.

d.      In China, the government has started the process of cooling domestic growth through regulatory adjustments to the real estate sector and tighter credit limits. As Chinese imports slow, and overcapacity in most manufacturing segments reaches record heights, the risk is that China’s export-led growth miracle will no longer sustain high GDP growth. While this is a boon for Western consumers (overcapacity will result in lower prices or higher price competition by Chinese manufacturers), it diminishes the capital-intensive exports from the US, Japan or Europe to that country. China’s 2008-2009 response to the economic crisis of vast loan disbursals to national businesses have created the conditions for deflation in most manufacturing segments, which will also inevitably lead to great price pressure for European, American and Japanese manufacturers.

e.       The ECB’s policy on a range of issues, from the European banking stress tests, to quantitative easing, to repo window financing of European banks, is increasingly calling the regulatory framework of this institution into question. The problem is compounded by very real fears that three of Europe’s five largest economies—Italy, Spain and the UK—are facing a double dip recession, either due to retrenchment in public spending (UK), or due to adverse conditions in key sectors (e.g. Italian exports; Spanish tourism & construction).

f.        We are long overdue for an inflationary correction in certain segments. I anticipate energy prices to increase. This is a factor of growing population growth and adoption of the automobile (particularly in Asia), rather than due to any economic recovery. I anticipate an oil price spike within the next 6 months due to unforeseen factors: turbulence in Iran and the Straights of Hormuz, supply disruptions elsewhere. I also anticipate the resumption of food price inflation. The recent decision by Russia to ban wheat exports is but one sign of this.

So we are in something of a bind: the only way to get a modicum of economic growth in 2010 appears to be further QE and government funding. Yet apart from China and India, nearly every major world economy is reaching historically unprecedented public debt levels (in peacetime conditions). Most world leaders (Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, etc.) have decided to take cosmetic measures in deficit reduction, while hoping that the resumption of economic growth will lead to the recovery of public finances. Yet apart from the 8 years of debt reduction under Bill Clinton in the 1990s (a time which was arguably unique in US history), there have not been too many cases of fiscal responsibility in periods of economic growth.

All this occurs against the backdrop of major demographic change and a paradigm shift in the availability of fossil fuels and the location of global manufacturing capacity. These forces will magnify the deteriorating fiscal conditions of most countries in the years to come.

Unless real, structural reforms are undertaken to (a) fundamentally reform the public sector and its relationship with citizens in most countries, and (b) create objective conditions for growth and employment, most countries are in for a very difficult time. So far, I don’t see many signs that such reforms are being considered on the necessary level in Greece, the United States, or elsewhere. Instead, we appear to be dealing with symptoms of problems, rather than their root causes, and sowing the seeds of future crises.

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Sunday, August 8, 2010

The sad state of private sector employment in Greece

In contrast to many of my previous posts, which deal with the operations of the Greek public sector, this one will address one of the more egregious aspects of the Greek private sector: the extremely poor state of private sector labour law and respect for basic employment conditions.

We should not forget that while a huge public debt has been incurred since 1981, the private sector accounts for between EUR 20 - 25 bln in unreported and unrecovered taxes each year in recent years. The following two examples illustrate exactly how bad the situation can be.

A long-standing friend works as a store director for an international retailer which recently announced plans to withdraw from Greece. This retailer was hit by the downturn, but one of the main reasons they are leaving Greece is because in the first half of this year, Greek banks have been providing working capital at an annual interest rate of 14%. I should point out that this is an EU-headquartered retailer with a 2009 global turnover of EUR 3.5 bln and a network of over 210 stores worldwide. This is not a neighbourhood psilihatzithiko.

Nonetheless, Greek banks apparently consider this retailer such a risk that working capital costs 14%, at a time when the banks have already benefited from over EUR 40 bln of ECB repo window liquidity at less than 1%.

Greek banks have also benefited from a EUR 10 bln troika package for recapitalisation, and the Karamanlis’ government’s support package of EUR 28 bln (not all of which was absorbed). Another EUR 25 bln is on the way. If anyone wants to understand why the economy of Greece is doing particularly badly at this time, look no further than the bankrupt state of the Greek banking sector.

But this is not the main point of this post. The store network of the international retailer I mentioned was bought by a Greek retailer, who coincidentally is under investigation for an allegedly rigged deal involving a previous transaction with the Greek government.

This Greek retailer made the following offer to the managers, including my friend:

·         Sign a contract to work 6 days per week, full time (minimum 12 hours per day)
·         Be available for special promotions through the year, including Sundays, Christmas and Easter
·         Lose related benefits, such as the corporate car.

My friend refused, and was thus fired.

This resignation is definitely the right decision to make. It’s clear that the Greek retailer has no intention of complying with even the basic requirement of Greek and European labour law. To sign a contract for an unlimited work week and work year, without benefits, and with a salary that is low to begin with is the height of stupidity.

It’s a system in which instead of investing in competent managers who might be able to find a way out of the present crisis, the owners focus on cost reduction—regardless of the human or legal cost.

It’s the very attitude which has gotten Greece into the present mess it finds itself. I expect it will not be long before we see this Greek retailer going cap in hand to the government, demanding subsidies to remain afloat.

This is certainly not a new situation in Greece. In 2008, I spent a short holiday at a 5* resort in Rhodes. I was surprised to see the same maitre d’table and the same waiters taking care of breakfast, lunch and dinner, three days in a row. On the fourth day, I pulled the fellow aside and asked him why he was still working, since by my count he would have worked at least 60 hours in five days.

The story he told me is chilling. The entire hotel staff work the same schedule: 14 hours a day (from 07:00 – 24:00, with a break for an afternoon siesta), 7 days a week, for the 6 months that the hotel is open.

At the end of the 6 month period, the hotel closes for the winter, and the entire staff is fired, to be re-hired again at the beginning of the next season. If the staff want the work, they accept. Otherwise, they are fired.

I can understand that the hotel owners are probably confronted with high fixed costs, low occupancy and declining or negative profitability. But this is no way to run a 5* hotel, let alone any enterprise. Forcing people to work 14 hours a day for 6 months is against every labour law in the European Union, let alone common sense.

This is especially the case for staff who:

·         Have no direct share in corporate profitability
·         Receive no or little indirect income (who tips in a hotel restaurant?)
·         Are over 55 years old and highly competent in their jobs
·         Are in daily direct contact with customers.

Whichever way you look at it, this is illegal and short-sighted behaviour. It’s a damning testament to the failure of the hotel management to run an enterprise properly. It’s a failure of Rhodes and Greece as a whole to compete successfully as a tourism destination. And it’s a failure of the Greek Ministry of Labour, who is apparently blind to a common industry practise.

Unfortunately, this situation will not be ending soon: Greece is characterised by thinly-capitalised small enterprises offering very low value-added, and little competitive differentiation either within Greece or outside it. There is overcapacity in nearly every sector, and certainly in tourism accommodation. As a result, nearly every sector is characterised by commoditisation: a situation where a good or service becomes a commodity, available globally, and at steadily lower prices thanks to global competition.

The way out of this is to differentiate oneself competitively and invest in areas where (a) pricing can be maintained, (b) direct access to consumers is possible, (c) repeat business accounts for at least 30% of turnover, and (d) a real, continual investment in human resource and process productivity can be made.

Unfortunately, few Greek companies or employers appear to realise this. The emphasis is on labour cost reduction, no matter what this means for productivity and competitiveness.

While the Labour Ministry employees are drinking coffee and fingering their worry beads, the managerial and working class of this country is being flushed down the metaphorical toilet. It hardly provides for much confidence in the future.  

Thursday, July 22, 2010

The Greek Bail-out Package and the Future Political Risks of Debt Restructuring

Greece’s elected government—and by extension all Greek citizens—face a tremendous moral dilemma which may not have been fully thought out. The IMF/Eurozone bail-out package of EUR 110 bln over three years has been, we learned in Kathimerini yesterday, accompanied by ECB purchases of Greek bonds to a total of EUR 44 bln. The ECB has purchased these bonds primarily from private banks: previous articles have stated that French banks have been at the forefront of Greek bond sellers.

Greece’s debt at the end of 2009 stood at EUR 298 bln, versus a GDP of EUR 237 bln. By the end of 2010, we can assume that total debt under the best case scenario will have risen by at least EUR 36 bln to EUR 331 bln as follows:

·         EUR 6 bln healthcare settlement
·         EUR 10 bln OSE debt assumption
·         EUR 2 bln other public organisations, guaranteed by the government
·         EUR 15 bln government deficit (assumption)

Taking into account a forecast -5% GDP decline (my estimate), Greece’s GDP will be EUR 225 bln, and its debt:GDP ratio will be 147%.

By 2012, when the bail-out package is set to expire, I estimate that in the best case, the public sector debt will have reached EUR 368 bln, or 165% of GDP. My estimate does not specifically include the interest cost of the debt, which I have no way of modeling given the opacity of public statistics on Greece’s debt portfolio.

Assuming the ECB purchases no further Greek bonds, the Eurozone governments, the IMF and the ECB will have purchased a total of EUR 154 bln of Greek sovereign debt, to which they will have senior rights.

This means that 48% of Greece’s total debt in 2012 will be held by the Eurozone, the IMF and the ECB.

And this is the problem: before the bail-out package was agreed, Greece could have defaulted on its debt, which was overwhelmingly held by private sector banks. This would have been painful, but it is a fairly routine affair.

From 2012 and afterwards, 48% of the debt will be held by sovereign partners or multilateral institutions. Will Greece really be able to restructure debt or impose a bond “haircut” on Germany or France?

What happens the day after that occurs?

It is clear to me that Greece is caught in a debt spiral. The absence of any decisive action by the government on issues such as OSE or even the healthcare debt settlement are indicative of the problem.

Minister of Infrastructure and Public Transport Dimitris Reppas, for example, yesterday stated that he would not accept layoffs at OSE, the Hellenic Railways Organisation:

Should no solution be found, sources claim that Brussels has even spoken of layoffs in order to reduce workers, although Infrastructure, Transport and Networks Minister Dimitris Reppas stressed yesterday he would not accept layoffs at OSE and ministry sources made it clear that the organization’s chief would not stay in his post if he were to witness OSE employees being laid off.

This is pure political theatre. There will not be a real “solution” to OSE–or any other loss-making Greek governmental organisation–as long as half-measures like this are taken.

On the healthcare settlement, although a minimum 15% haircut on the settlement (amounting to a debt restructuring) is expected, the government never made an attempt to figure out which contracts should be honoured, and which contracts should be investigated for corrupt practice: all contracts were honoured at face value. This rewards the corrupt, while punishing the honest.

This same half-hearted approach is visible all across the government. It is seen in the ridiculous attempt to solve the “cabotage” issue with quantitative restrictions reminiscent of 1970s dirigisme. It is seen in the government’s attempt to extend liquidity to Greece’s banks, and then require them to use that liquidity to buy government bonds, or extend loans to government organisations. It is seen in the incomprehensible decision to prop-up companies in the textiles or fertilizers sector which should have gone bankrupt a long time ago.

Absent bold, radical action to close loss-making government organisations, downsize the public sector, and free the private sector from the absurd tangle of regulations which are largely meaningless in their supposed utility, there will not be an exit from the debt trap we are in. Neither major political party has come forward with a coherent vision or policy programme to address this.

My advice is: prepare for the worse-case scenario to materialise. The clock is ticking. The scale of the problem is clear; the end-date in the best case is late 2012 or early 2013: it may come sooner than we think if the bond yields on recent issues are any guide.